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Summary 
 
This article analyses public–private partnerships in Belgium‘s economic diplomacy from the 
perspective of multinational companies (MNCs). The concept of corporate political activity 
(CPA) is therefore introduced. CPA is seen as a part of business diplomacy (BD), which 
companies use in order to defend their interests. Eight stock-listed Belgian multinationals 
(BMNCs) were interviewed using single, semi-structured interviews. This exploratory study 
focused on whether or not companies contact public officials, which strategies they use and 
how these strategies are organized in order to defend their interests abroad. The empirical data 
revealed that BMNCs enter into relationships with national and supranational actors. 
Information-sharing is the central aim of these relationships, because of the mutual realization 
that these contacts are important. This was less so, however, at the international level. In 
short, BMNCs will, depending on the subject and/or the institutional context, rely on the 
services offered by Belgian economic diplomacy. They will initially, however, also include 
diplomatic functions of their own. 
 
 
Key Words 
 
Diplomacy, business, public–private partnerships, multinationals. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Belgium is performing poorly in economic terms. Globally, Belgium is losing market share. 
Between 2002 and 2011, Belgium‘s importance in world export of goods declined by 21 per 
cent, and exports of services fell by 9 percent — for one of the most globalized countries in 
the world, with a foreign trade to GDP ratio of 89 per cent, this is a worrying trend.
1
 During 
its annual meeting of diplomats and entrepreneurs, the President of the Federation of Belgian 
Companies stressed that nowadays, more than ever, Belgian ambassadors are of the utmost 
importance for the development of Belgian business. Exports and foreign investments are also 
vital for economic recovery.
2 
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 Leo Sleuwaegen and Carine Peeters, ‗Belgium in the New Global Economy: Export and International 
Sourcing‘, a study commissioned by FEB-VBO and Deloitte Belgium, 2012, pp. 1–69. 
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This opinion is not so surprising. Economic diplomacy is seen as one of the key tasks 
of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3
 Throughout history, the preservation of economic 
interests has been one of the core elements of Belgium‘s foreign policy.4 During the mid-
1990s, however, several Belgian governments stepped up their efforts with regard to 
economic diplomacy.
5
 
The root cause of this evolution was the intensification of economic globalization. 
This resulted in an international economic environment that was characterized by increasing 
nervousness and competition.
6
 Companies, too, felt the implications, resulting in a growing 
competition to retain and conquer market share. States and companies had to collaborate in a 
complex and changing international environment.
7
  
Starting from the specific economic context of Belgium (that is, a small, open 
economy heavily dependent on foreign countries), increased economic interdependence 
associated with a growing competitiveness, and the global economic crisis, this article will 
investigate how Belgian multinationals (BMNCs) defend their interests abroad, and whether 
or not this happens in collaboration with Belgian diplomats.  
BMNCs are the central research units since economic diplomacy can only be 
understood if one grasps the evolving schemes of thought, identities and actions that move 
economic interest groups (including multinationals). Together with domestic politicians, they 
exert the largest influence on (the formulation of) economic diplomacy,
8
 and BMNCs are thus 
the central research units in this article.   
The article first introduces two concepts: business diplomacy (BD); and corporate 
political activity (CPA). Both need to be seen as tools to resolve the central research question. 
Next, the conceptual model and methodology used are described, followed by a presentation 
of the results. The last section deals with the conclusion and discussion.  
 
 
Business Diplomacy and Corporate Political Activity 
 
As stated earlier, BMNCs are the central research units. As well as allowing a better 
understanding of economic diplomacy, focusing on BMNCs facilitates adopting a slightly 
different position than that of interest representation and diplomacy studies. The reason is 
threefold. First, albeit the empirical and normative significance of companies, little attention 
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has been paid to their individual functioning. Political scientists principally study pressure 
groups on the macro or societal level, but companies are not a general interest group. 
Understanding the interest representation of business associations does not automatically 
equal understanding the behaviour of a single company.
9
 Second, putting individual 
companies at the forefront of this research makes it possible to overcome the dichotomy of 
political and economic, national and international and public and private components. 
Traditionally the focus lies on national, political and public components.
10
 Lastly, the wide 
gap between the field of international relations and international business is overcome.
 11 
Authors recognize that companies experience the need to bring in advocacy on the 
international level and that they will do so.
12
 A bird‘s eye view of the literature dealing with 
the advocacy of companies vis-à-vis governments and other stakeholders reveals that different 
terms exist to label this activity, such as ‗private sector diplomacy‘,13 ‗corporate diplomacy‘,14 
and ‗business diplomacy‘.15 Chief executive officers (CEOs) operating in international 
markets have a double role. They can be seen as ambassadors and as business leaders.
16
 
Business diplomacy (BD) captures these ambassadorial activities.
17
 This article adopts the 
following definition of BD: 
  
BD is diplomacy practised by individual companies. It is a mechanism to achieve the central 
goal, namely ensuring the existence of a company, through the use of representation, 
communication and negotiation towards other (non-)economic stakeholders to defend 
company interests. Managing these relations is seen as useful because it enables the chance to 
avoid unnecessary and unwanted conflicts. Also, the external environment wherein a company 
acts is made more susceptible to their specific interests.
18 
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 Saner, Yiu and Sondergaard developed the idea of BD the most, hence their terminology will be used in this 
article. 
18
 This definition is based on definitions provided by Jan Melissen, cited in Saner and Yiu, ‗International 
Economic Diplomacy‘, pp. 11 and 16; and Paul Sharp, ‗Herbert Butterfield, the English School and the 
Civilizing Virtues of Diplomacy‘, International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4, 2003, pp. 855–878. 
In annexe 1 at the end of this article, a diagram clarifies the notion of BD. The arrows refer to the 
relationship that MNCs establish with the various key stakeholders, including competitors, public opinion in a 
given country B, the embassy of the country where the MNC has its headquarters, the press, the ministry of 
foreign affairs where the headquarters are situated, international organizations, NGOs, and the government of a 
given country A.  
 This definition bears similarity with the notion of economic diplomacy. Governments 
also want to assure their own survival. They use economic diplomacy essentially to promote 
national economic welfare and security.
19
 National economic welfare and security are 
essential to provide social welfare and thus a stable government. Companies find managing 
relations with non-economic stakeholders useful, given that it is possible to avoid conflicts 
and defend their interests. This proactive element is also applicable to the notion of economic 
diplomacy, since governments pursue economic interests through peaceful means.
20
 Both 
businesses and governments do this using representation, communication and negotiation.  
Diplomacy is sometimes seen as a functional aspect that occurs in every form of 
political organization. It is rather unclear whether present-day traditional state diplomacy is 
adapted to cope with twenty-first century problems and to provide adequate advocacy for 
businesses and other non-state actors.
21
 Still, in light of global competitiveness, states need 
the ability to attract foreign companies to their territories and to prevent their companies from 
completely relocating. States thus became engaged in so-called ‗triangular diplomacy‘. 
Companies, on the other hand, need to become more statesmanlike
22
 and negotiate with 
governments. As a result, there is a strong similarity between the diplomacy of states and that 
of companies.  
Still, decision-makers have institutionalized forms of power and they exercise this 
through the imposition of standards, regulations and policy decisions that have an impact on 
various non-state stakeholders
23
 and, to a certain extent, on companies. It is reasonable to 
assume that companies will experience the need to defend their interests towards government 
officials, at home and abroad. Of course, within the political sciences, attention is given 
towards initiatives about how to influence state policy, but this seldom happens by putting 
individual companies at the forefront, nor through the use of BD.
24
 If we take a closer look at 
the management literature, attention is focused on the impact that decision-makers could exert 
on the functioning of companies and how companies deal with this. The concept of CPA is 
therefore introduced and defined as follows: 
 
CPA is various efforts that are undertaken by companies that seek access to decision-makers 
in order to influence political decision-making in view of their own interests. In an 
environment that is characterized by increasing rivalry because of globalization and 
technological developments, companies strive to achieve a competitive advantage. This 
competitive advantage consists of efficiency, market position and legitimacy.
25
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 It is necessary to specify the interpretation of political decision-making within this 
definition. Within the CPA literature, little research deals with the international level.
26
 Still, 
economic globalization confronts companies with various legislations that are imposed by 
different political actors and institutions
27
 on national, supranational and international levels. 
The likelihood that companies become a victim of pernicious policy-making thus increases if 
they operate on multiple, national markets.
28
 Modern states also forge transnational alliances 
with other states to enhance their ability to exercise a certain policy towards companies that 
are situated on their territories.
29
 Besides this, there is also little attention directed towards the 
specific features of multinational firms.
30 
 
  
Conceptual Model and Methodology 
 
In order to verify whether public–private partnerships exist in Belgian economic diplomacy, 
we need to resolve the following research question: How do BMNCs defend their interests 
abroad vis-à-vis national, supranational and international governments/organizations, and by 
doing this, do they collaborate with Belgian diplomats? In resolving this question, it is 
possible to distinguish whether BMNCs contact public officials, which strategies they use, 
and how any contact is organized within and outside the company. Moreover, by looking at 
the individual behaviour of companies, this explorative research tries to understand Belgian 
economic diplomacy, since companies are mainly responsible for exerting influence on it. The 
conceptual model is presented in annexe 2 at the end of this article, which makes a number of 
assumptions based on the CPA literature,
31
 combined with insights from political science 
scholars.   
The first assumption is that it is mainly large companies that practise CPA, because 
they have more resources and influence at their disposal,
32
 hence the article‘s emphasis on 
multinationals. Second, the nationality of a company is important. Companies that do not 
have the same nationality as the government use less CPA,
33
 hence the research focuses on 
BMNCs. Third, the subject is of great importance whether or not a company uses CPA.
34
 The 
nature of the Belgian economy, which can be described as a small, open economy where there 
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is extreme dependence on trade and export,
35
 as well as increased competitiveness in the 
global economy,
36
 leads to the assumption that BMNCs practice CPA. Defending foreign 
interests are of the utmost importance, so the BMNCs probably use CPA. Fourth, the 
institutional context also determines the use of CPA.
37
 According to the policy network 
theory, both the supranational and the international institutional context provide access for 
companies to engage in CPA.
38
 The Belgian federal institutional context requires active input 
from the private sector.
39
 Fifth, the fact that CPA is limited to state policy is criticized. There 
must be a wider application,
40
 hence CPA will be handled on the national, supranational and 
international levels. Sixth, there are various strategies consisting of tactics within CPA 
literature. Four strategies can be distinguished: information; financial incentive; a 
constituency-building strategy;
41
 and that of pressure.
42
 Seventh, the underlying intention of 
CPA may be directed at creating a lasting relationship, or rather an ad-hoc one.
43
 Eight, public 
actors can create access points for CPA, this establishing a formal relationship. If this is not, it 
is an informal relationship.
44
 Finally, strategies can be used individually or collectively.  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
Starting from the described assumptions above and the conceptual model in annexe 2, the 
actual interviews were structured around several research questions.  
First, in order to test whether BMNCs target multiple actors through the use of CPA, 
the following questions were asked: Do BMNCs have regular contact with the Belgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Belgian embassies abroad? Do they have regular contacts 
with the European Union and other international organizations? Also, they had to evaluate 
whether or not they found these channels effective in defending their interests. 
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Second, which strategies do BMNCs use? Do they use information, financial 
incentive, the constituency-building strategy, or pressure? Will they use a combination of 
several strategies, or will they combine different tactics from each strategy? 
Subsequently, what is the nature of the relationship arising from this interaction 
between BMNCs and legislators and organizations? Do relationships aim to be long-lasting, 
or do they have to be seen as ad-hoc? 
The last proposition looks at initiatives that BMNCs take to organize the use of 
strategies. Does this happen internally, or externally, or both? More precisely, do BMNCs 
create a specific department whose primary task is to monitor non-economic events that could 
influence the company‘s functioning? Are BMNCs recruiting former diplomats to help them? 
And on the external level, do they prefer to collaborate with others, or rather act individually? 
 
     
Methodology 
 
The used sample is the BEL20,
45
 whose composition is based on criteria such as the presence 
of headquarters in Belgium or a large number of employees in Belgium.
46
 Companies on this 
list have a relatively large impact on the Belgian or European economy.
47
 Briefly put, 
BMNCs on this list are big, which enhances the use of CPA.
48
 Also, by opting to interview 
BMNCs that have their headquarters in Belgium and are not subsidiaries of foreign-based 
companies, the likelihood of CPA increases.
49
 Thus, the used sample is a theoretical one. This 
stems from the fact that in Belgium, research on BD and CPA is still in its infancy.  
It was decided to work with single, semi-structured interviews, since inaccessibility of 
data can in this way be overcome.
50
 Also, there is a higher response rate, non-verbal 
communication can be taken into account, there was the ability to control the setting, 
spontaneous expressions can be registered, and it is possible to probe.
51
 In the literature there 
are neither cut-and-dried nor manageable questionnaires available. Questionnaires from 
research on BD and CPA were thus combined. All the interviews were tape-recorded with the 
permission of the interviewees. This enhances the reliability of the processed results. An 
interview form was used so that each respondent received the same explanation concerning 
the research, and so that answers to the questions could be written down.  
In presenting the results, anonymity was granted, since some questions regarded 
company-sensitive issues. By guaranteeing anonymity, the possible bias of receiving socially 
desirable answers is thus being avoided as much as possible.  
 
 
Results 
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After eliminating holdings and financial institutions, twelve companies were contacted. Eight 
were willing to participate and represent the actual realized sample. In terms of percentages, 
this is a response rate of 66 per cent, with a non-response rate of 33 per cent. On average there 
is a non-response of 40 to 50 per cent in personal interviews,
52
 so this non-response rate is 
lower.  
 
 
Research Question 1: Do BMNCs Target Multiple Actors through the Use of CPA? 
 
With regard to the first question, that of whether or not the interviewed BMNCs target 
multiple actors, the results are diverse. On the national level, the eight BMNCs focus their 
CPA primarily on regional or national public officials, since they tend to behave as much as 
possible like a local company. The main reason that BMNCs contact foreign officials directly, 
and not through Belgian diplomatic channels, is because ‗it is not always appropriate‘53 and 
they try to ‗adapt themselves to the region they operate in and try to dissolve possible 
problems locally, with a local management that has the same nationality as the government as 
such‘.54 The use of direct contacts on the national level needs some refinements, since ‗there 
are strong differences noticeable on the functioning and accessibility of public officials‘ and 
‗in some countries it is impossible to get in touch with government officials when certain 
statements are made or policies are laid down that directly interfere with company goals or 
functioning‘.55 Belgian diplomats and Belgian embassies are only enabled in certain cases, or 
as support: 
 
Belgian embassies and the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs only play a role when a dossier 
is sizeable, complies with the position that the company takes abroad, and if there is a form of 
political visibility of the company‘s activities. There is a difference between small and big 
dossiers, and there are a whole range of options that a company can use, one of them being the 
support of the Belgian diplomatic routes. But to put it bluntly, a company won‘t need a 
Belgian diplomatic representative to buy a box of pencils.
56 
 
Besides this supportive role, all of the interviewed companies have frequent and direct 
contacts with Belgian embassies or the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or they have 
plans to have them in the near future.  
On the European level, the same pattern is witnessed. All of the interviewees have 
direct contacts with European institutions, or plan to have them in the future. Five of them use 
both the Belgian government and direct contacts within the EU to exert influence. Company S 
even adopts the same structure as the EU: ‗In every EU member state the company is active, 
and subsidiaries receive instructions from the headquarters in order to influence national 
policy-makers. It is therefore possible to use different channels to emit the same message‘.57  
On the international level, the use of direct contacts to influence policy-makers is 
almost non-existent. Five of the eight interviewed BMNCs indicated that the international 
decision-making level is of no relevance, since: ‗The bulk of the legislation that is vital for the 
company is created at the European level or at the national level. International organizations 
are of no direct importance‘ and ‗business associations are responsible for the monitoring of 
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international organizations‘.58 Direct participation by companies in international decision-
making is difficult, so they will try to influence national governments. It could even be 
possible that the national implementation of international decisions is blocked, since 
companies exert most influence on the national level.
59
 This could provide an explanation as 
to why four BMNCs indicated that they influence the Belgian government. Company Y even 
uses only the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to influence relevant international decision-
making, since the company‘s significance is big enough and there is ‗a direct contact between 
the company and the cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The cabinet will 
inform the right people so the company gets assistance‘.60 The other BMNCs use the 
Permanent Representation of Belgium at the EU, since ‗they seek advice within the existing 
channels when a new problem arises‘,61 or they use a mixture of both. Two companies 
indicated that they would seek direct contact with the international organization, but admit 
that they were never confronted with any problems at this level.  
Research question 1 can thus be accepted, while taking some remarks into 
consideration. The ‗further‘ the levels at which public actors or problems are situated, the less 
the BMNCs will use direct contacts and instead will use various other channels such as their 
own national government and embassies. Also, the efficiency of the different channels is 
highly dependent on which level they are situated on. National and supranational channels are 
perceived as being the most useful when it comes to problem-solving or exerting influence. 
Also, the issue being discussed and/or the institutional context are important if companies use 
different channels to influence. 
 
  
Research Question 2: Which Strategies do BMNCs Use? 
 
With regard to the second question, the results clearly indicate that BMNCs mainly prefer the 
information strategy, wherein they use several tactics. The other strategies — the financial 
incentive strategy, the constituency-building strategy and pressure — are less important.  
Seven companies indicated that, within the information strategy, they disseminate 
their own research and survey results. Research and survey results are only distributed if there 
is no adverse effect on the competitive position of the company. If so, they pursue the biggest 
possible transparency.
62
 Most companies prefer to distribute the obtained results individually, 
and three companies indicated that this happened mainly through business associations, since 
these organizations are paid by companies to do so. Documents are mainly distributed at the 
national and EU levels.  
All the interviewed companies, except one, sometimes act as an expert in certain 
cases. Four stated that this happened on the explicit request by public officials, but in a rather 
informal way. According to two BMNCs, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sometimes 
uses the companies‘ expertise regarding certain regions, since they have a long-term presence. 
There is a ‗non-binding exchange of ideas without the formal undertaking that the company is 
seen as an expert‘.63 Two companies indicated that this happens more formally, since they 
‗participate in surveys of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Belgium‘s image 
abroad, and offer suggestions on how Belgium could attract foreign investments‘, and in 
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participating in the ‗Business Council‘.64 Also, at the European level the European 
Commission sometimes requests technical consultations with companies, and, if so, the 
company ‗will not neglect to send experts to have technical debates on certain issues‘.65 These 
results support the research of Bouwen
66
 and of Coen and Grant,
67
 who indicated that the 
European institutions benefit from information provided by companies. The Belgian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs also benefits from company expertise.  
Only two companies indicated that they do not engage in any form of lobbying, one of 
the tactics within the information strategy. One company puts it like this: ‗The company‘s 
reputation is strong enough to, if there arises any problem, report this openly. Still, this 
doesn‘t mean if public authorities organize events and company representatives get in touch 
with them during these events, they won‘t strive to achieve good contacts‘.68 Interestingly, 
three companies that use lobbying think that the notion is loaded. One indicated that it thus 
prefers to use ‗advocacy‘.69 Also, ‗the notion of lobbying is not used, not even during 
meetings with competitors, where in fact lobbying takes place‘, and even ‗the image exists of 
the lobbyist who frequently crashes receptions, while this, and certainly nowadays, is not the 
case. Complex and time-consuming cases need to be dealt with‘.70  
The dispersion of values, customs and regulatory standards is also popular among the 
interviewed companies. Five BMNCs indicated that this happens empathically, even by 
‗explicitly profiling themselves as an opinion leader in the field of R&D‘.71 Two of the 
companies do this less, but ‗in each presentation of an official announcement, which is 
prepared before meetings with ambassadors or other public officials, there are always a few 
pages dealing with the company‘s responsibilities and values‘,72 or ‗there is the annual 
circulation of a corporate citizens‘ report‘.73 
Companies indicated that they use neither the financial nor the constituency-building 
strategy. None of them provides direct, financial support to political parties or other public 
officials. Because of the big operational range of company Y, the interviewee could not 
exclude what happens in other countries, but if any financial support is given, it would happen 
within the legal framework of that country.
74
 Two companies had established political action 
committees (PACs), but this was an employee initiative and not that of the company itself.  
None of the interviewed BMNCs provide financial compensation to public officials to 
give a speech during company events. Six of them do sometimes invite public officials during 
certain events, and two indicated that, in certain cases, travel expenses are reimbursed.  
Public officials sometimes have a mandate within the company and they receive a 
financial contribution. Three BMNCs mentioned spontaneously that they have public officials 
                                                          
64
 Company X, 9 March 2009. The ‗Business Council‘ was an initiative of Belgium‘s former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Karel De Gucht. He wanted to have regular meetings with the key captains of industry in the Belgian 
economy to improve Belgium‘s economic diplomacy. His successor continued the initiative, although nowadays 
there are no longer such meetings. 
65
 Company S, 24 March 2009. 
66
 Pieter Bouwen, ‗Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access‘, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 3, 2002, pp. 365–390. 
67
 David Coen and Wyn Grant, ‗Corporate Political Strategy and Global Policy: A Case Study of the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue‘, European Business Journal, vol. 13, no. 1, 2001, pp. 37–44. 
68
 Company Z, 5 March 2009. 
69
 Company S, 9 March 2009. 
70
 Company V, 16 March 2009. 
71
 Company X, 9 March 2009. 
72
 Company Z, 5 March 2009. 
73
 Company Y, 6 March 2009. 
74
 Company Y, 6 March 2009. 
on their boards of directors.
75
  Company U stated that financial compensation is sometimes 
given to public officials for providing a specific consultancy assignment. These public 
officials have a certain role or expertise regarding a specific topic, but this does not happen 
very frequently.
76
 This also happens in company V, but not in Belgium.
77 
Contrary to what the existing literature suggests, companies will not finance specific 
UN projects in order to gain market access, increase influence on existing and new markets 
by eliminating (in)visible trade barriers, and to promote self-regulation and standardization 
that is beneficial to them.
78
 If BMNCs do provide support to development projects, this is 
mainly linked with direct activities of the company and/or the region in which they are active.  
BMNCs perceive themselves as political neutral,
79
 so they will not take initiatives 
such as mobilizing their personnel/clients or publishing advertisements in order to provide 
indirect political support. Two companies indicated that they sometimes give press 
conferences, but this happens within the framework of membership of a certain business 
association, or while presenting results of scientific research in collaboration with the Belgian 
government.  
The last strategy that companies sometimes use, according to the literature, is pressure. 
None of the interviewed BMNCs indicated that they use the threat of delocalization to exert 
influence. Four companies indicate instead that they strive to be on good terms with public 
officials. Moreover, two of them literally proclaimed the same: ‗[…] maybe the company is 
big in Belgium, but this isn‘t the case abroad. There, we are one of many others‘.80 Three 
companies stated that the use of threats or exerting pressure is not a part of the company‘s 
nature. Still, this needs to be refined, since some kind of latent awareness exists that they do 
have some kind of power vis-à-vis governments: ‗In a very complex case where a lot is at 
stake, delocalization is, at the end, the ultimate argument‘. Also, ‗the company won‘t neglect 
to mention to a particular government that it will reconsider possible, future investments. 
Disinvestments can become an option if the government keeps continuing to hinder the 
company‘.81 And, ‗if public officials really work against the company, like for example 
through nationalization, of course the company won‘t stay there. It won‘t be the politicians 
who will stop the company‘.82 Lastly, companies won‘t neglect to ‗alert of the consequences 
of certain policies. The company clearly indicates whether problems would arise because of 
certain legislation (initiatives)‘.83 Nevertheless the previous bold statements and the threat of 
delocalization are seldom used, since ‗this is only possible if investments in the country are 
not too big, so a quick exit is possible‘, and thus ‗it will only be used if delocalization can 
actually be realized in a short amount of time. Mostly, the company‘s scope within the 
countries they are active in is too big‘.84   
The same pattern can be distinguished when it comes to the tactic of taking legal 
actions. A company carefully formulates: ‗Individually, we won‘t take legal actions very 
                                                          
75
 A careful examination of the other boards of directors indicated that two other companies had public officials 
on this board, although this was not mentioned during their interviews.  
76
 Company U, 17 March 2009. 
77
 Company V, 16 March 2009. 
78
 Shareen Hertel, ‗The Private Side of Global Governance‘, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 1, 
2003, pp. 41–50; and Dominic Kelly, ‗The Business of Diplomacy: The International Chamber of Commerce 
Meets the United Nations‘, CSGR Working Paper, no. 74, 2001, pp. 1–27. 
79
 Company S, 24 March 2009. 
80
 Company Z, 5 March 2009; and Company X, 9 March 2009. 
81
 Company V, 16 March 2009. 
82
 Company Z, 5 March 2009. 
83
 Company U, 17 March 2009. 
84
 Company V, 16 March 2009. 
quickly, but if the whole sector does, the possibility could exist‘.85 Also, ‗juridical actions are 
not undertaken to achieve something from public authorities. They are only used to defend 
certain rights that a company has‘.86 
BMNCs thus mainly use the information strategy, and within this strategy they use 
several tactics. In some cases, public authorities use information that is provided by 
companies. The use of pressure was formally denied by all of the interviewees, regardless of 
the presence of a latent awareness, but companies will mainly ‗through openness and clarity 
concerning possible issues that may arise, [and by holding] negotiations, asking questions, 
delivering contributions to the society where one is active, the company strives in a proactive 
way towards mutual understanding with public authorities‘.87 Question two can thus also be 
affirmed since ‗the various distinctive strategies to influence public authorities must be seen 
as phases within a bigger plan. One cannot determine which strategy or tactic is the most 
efficient within a certain case or which one needs to be used‘.88 To conclude, several 
strategies are used by BMNCs, but they prefer the information strategy with its various 
tactics. 
 
 
Research Question 3: What is the Nature of the Relationship Arising between BMNCs and 
Public Officials? 
 
The underlying objective of the strategies employed can aim at realizing a long-term 
relationship or rather an ad-hoc one with public authorities.
89
 Five BMNCs explicitly 
indicated that they have regular contact with public officials, two of them even daily, 
especially with European institutions. Contacts with the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
are less frequent.  
Five interviewees spontaneously indicated that these contacts are requested and 
stimulated by public officials. It is a two-way process starting from the mutual understanding 
that the established contacts are important. Only two companies stated that public authorities 
are only contacted in specific cases, and one BMNC does not yet have a strategy for how to 
deal with public authorities. 
The nature of the achieved contacts is diverse. BMNCs mainly prefer to have formal 
but discrete contacts, away from public opinion, because ‗it is important that the company 
gains a lot of trust and is very veracious. Within a negotiating situation, a company needs to 
speak up, and quite often about things that can‘t be expressed publicly. This is why the 
company prefers to have very discrete contacts‘.90 
Public events are, according to the BMNCs, also relevant, as more informal contacts 
are established there. At a later stage, those are also important for realizing more formal 
contacts. 
Six BMNCs indicated that now, or in the near future, the realization of a network is 
intended so that ‗at appropriate times, in tempore non suspecto, public actors that have a 
certain relevance for the company can be influenced‘, especially as ‗when the company has a 
specific question or problem, it is beneficial that public officials know them and know what 
the company is doing‘.91 Also, ‗the realization of ongoing contacts is important‘.92 
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Question three can thus also be answered affirmatively, since BMNOs try to establish 
a good relationship with public actors. This relationship is not necessarily ad hoc. In short, 
there is a public–private dialogue where information-sharing is the central objective, inspired 
by a mutual recognition that these contacts are important. 
 
 
Research Question 4: Which Initiatives are Taken by BMNCs to Organize the Use of 
Strategies? 
 
According to the literature, many companies undertake little systematic efforts to understand 
international relations and diplomacy.
93
 The diplomatic skills of companies are 
underdeveloped and disproportionally distributed.
94
 They need to develop their own 
diplomatic capacities.
95
 This process is currently happening in big companies, which are 
reorganizing and radically changing their PR departments.
96
 As well as this internal 
reorganization, companies also employ former diplomats to counsel CEOs or lead a 
department of international relations.
97
  
The results obtained for research question four are thus mixed. Internal organization 
does takes place, but not as it was described before. Five companies do not have a specific 
department managing their relations with public officials or for dealing with the monitoring, 
assessment and reporting of non-commercial trends in those areas where the company is 
present. These tasks are not centralized in one department, but are integrated in departments 
such as public affairs, corporate communications, corporate affairs, community relations and 
communications, and environment, health and safety. 
Moreover, no such plans exist to create such a department in the near future: ‗it is not 
a priority‘,98 ‗not yet a necessity‘,99 ‗the current structure of the company doesn‘t allow it‘, or 
‗the company is too small that such a department simply wouldn‘t be profitable‘.100  However, 
this does not mean that there is not a potential importance and usefulness for other, bigger 
companies.
101
 This means that the diplomatic skills of BMNCs are still underdeveloped and 
disproportionally distributed.  
Three of the companies interviewed do have a specific department dealing with the 
previously mentioned tasks. Interviews showed that where such a departments exists, it will 
be organized as described in the literature. Namely, it reports directly to the CEO of the 
company.
102
  
Only two companies recruited former diplomats or persons who had been previously 
active in the public sphere. Remarkably, these two BMNCs also have a separate department 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
92
 Company V, 16 March 2009. 
93
 Saner and Yiu, ‗International Economic Diplomacy‘, pp. 27–28; and Saner, Yiu and Sondergaard, ‗Business 
Diplomacy Management‘, p. 83. 
94
 Muldoon, ‗The Diplomacy of Business‘. 
95
 Budd, ‗Opinion… Foreign Policy Acumen Needed by Global CEOs‘; and Saner, Yiu and Sondergaard, 
‗Business Diplomacy Management‘, p. 83. 
96
 Muldoon, ‗The Diplomacy of Business‘, pp. 354–355. 
97
 Langhorne, ‗The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors‘, pp. 337–338; Saner and Yiu, ‗International Economic 
Diplomacy‘, pp. 27–28; and Saner, Yiu and Sondergaard, ‗Business Diplomacy Management‘, p. 83. 
98
 Company Z, 5 March 2009. 
99
 Company W, 13 March 2009. 
100
 Company T, 23 March 2009. 
101
 Company X, 9 March 2009. 
102
 Budd, ‗Opinion… Foreign Policy Acumen Needed by Global CEOs‘; and Saner, Yiu and Sondergaard, 
‗Business Diplomacy Management‘, p. 83. See also the interviews with Company V, 16 March 2009; and 
Company S, 24 March 2009. 
that focuses on BD. In one company these former public officials are recruited because of 
specific consultancy projects,
103
 and in the other company this happens on a contractual basis 
within its operational framework. Three other BMNCs have former diplomats or persons who 
were previously active in the public sphere on their management board, but this implies that 
they are not active in the operational framework of the company. These results undermine 
Langhorne‘s argument that companies can no longer rely on outsourcing certain tasks to an 
external PR office and would therefore recruit former diplomats.
104
 
The external organization, however, is more diverse. All of the interviewed BMNCs 
are members of Belgian and other national foreign business associations. The BMNCs, bar 
one, are also members of European business associations, but only three are member of 
business associations on the international level. Most interviewed BMNCs actively participate 
within these organizations through participation in think tanks or working groups.  
Half of the surveyed BMNCs sometimes use consultancy offices or lobbying 
organizations, and one has plans to do so in the near future. Two out of these four companies 
stated that they only use consultancy offices and even ‗seldom‘105 or ‗only during peak 
moments, in cases of preparatory work or the monitoring of certain processes‘. This company 
‗won‘t hide behind consultants to realize certain objectives‘.106 One of the BMNCs indicated 
that it never uses consultants or lobbyists, since it believes ‗in the power of direct advocacy 
starting from within the company or business associations‘.107 
Parallel trends emerge, just like with the first research question. The subject is also the 
main explanatory factor to judge which business associations are the most efficient. Besides 
this, foreign national business associations are seen as the most efficient. On the European 
level, both national and European business associations are perceived as being useful, with a 
slight preference to use the European ones or to combine the influence of both national and 
European associations. At the international level, five companies indicated that they do not 
experience any significant problems and therefore they do not use any.  
To conclude, the internal organization of CPA strategies is often not very thorough, as 
suggested or described in the scientific literature. The external organization, on the other 
hand, is more distinct. BMNCs initially prefer to organize themselves in business 
associations, where most are already actively participating. Business associations on the 
national level, whether this is at home or abroad, and European associations are assessed as 
being the most efficient. The use of external consultants or lobbyists does not happen very 
often and participation within international initiatives seldom happens. 
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
In order to verify whether public–private partnerships exist in the Belgian economic 
diplomacy, we need to resolve the following research questions: how do BMNCs defend their 
interests abroad vis-à-vis national, supranational and international governments/organizations, 
and by doing this, do they collaborate with Belgian diplomats? By resolving this question, it 
is possible to distinguish whether BMNCs contact public officials, which strategies they use, 
and how their contact is organized within and outside the company. Moreover, by looking at 
the individual behaviour of companies, this explorative research tries to understand Belgian 
economic diplomacy, since companies are mainly responsible for exerting influence on it. 
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Through qualitative research, namely single semi-structured interviews, with n = 8 BMNCs, 
there was an examination of whether the BMNCs had contacts with (multiple) public actors, 
whether they practised CPA, which strategies they thereby wielded, how this was both 
internally and externally organized, and which relationships arose with public officials. After 
this empirical research, the model in Annexe 4 at the end of this article can be presented, with 
the following refined propositions noted. 
1a) Abroad, the CPA of BMNCs is primarily focused on regional or national public 
actors. Companies behave themselves as much as possible like a ‗domestic‘ company. 
1b) The use of CPA on the European level is initially directed towards European 
officials. 
1c) In some cases, national policy-makers are also targeted when companies use CPA 
on the European level. Only when a subject has sufficient relevance and/or if the institutional 
context does not provide access points for companies to address foreign officials will BMNCs 
seek the assistance of Belgian embassies or the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
1d) Companies seldom interfere on the international level. Topics discussed here are 
of less relevance and/or the institutional context does not allow direct participation. If not, 
companies seek support from Belgian public actors. 
2) BMNCs can use multiple strategies but prefer using diverse tactics within the 
information strategy. 
3a) The use of information strategy aims to create a public–private dialogue where 
information sharing is the central goal, from the mutual realization that these contacts are 
important to both parties involved. 
3b) The nature of the relationship that BMNCs pursue is a lengthy one based on 
openness and transparency, where formal but discrete contacts can take place. Informal 
contacts aim at creating a network. 
4) A thorough internal organization for BMNCs is of less importance. The external 
organization is more extensive and diverse. 
  
 
Discussion 
 
But what are the implications of these results for Belgium‘s economic diplomacy? As 
described earlier, it is rather unclear whether present-day traditional state diplomacy is 
adapted to cope with twenty-first century problems and to provide adequate advocacy for 
businesses and other non-state actors.
108
 Is ‗triangular diplomacy‘ taking place where, on the 
one hand, governments need to negotiate with companies, and on the other hand, companies 
need to become more statesmanlike?
109
 To put it differently, is Belgium‘s economic 
diplomacy effectively at the forefront to support its own businesses, and is it autonomous in 
nature? Or is it just a part of the bigger, transnational planning of the BMNCs?
110
  
The empirical data shows that the majority of BMNCs see direct contacts with foreign 
and supranational public actors as the most efficient channels to defend their interests abroad. 
This may indicate that BMNCs apply ‗state–firm‘ diplomacy.111 Companies are aware of the 
fact that states are structurally dependent on their wealth-creating ability.
112
 An indication of 
this is reflected in the latent consciousness of companies that they will point out possible 
                                                          
108
 Murray, ‗Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies‘, pp. 22–39. 
109
 Strange, ‗State, Firms and Diplomacy‘, pp. 6–7; and Okano-Heijmans, ‗Conceptualizing Economic 
Diplomacy‘, p. 12. 
110
 Coolsaet, ‗Belgische handelsprospectie in de wereld‘, pp. 497–498. 
111
 Strange, ‗State, Firms and Diplomacy‘, p. 7. 
112
 Strange, ‗State, Firms and Diplomacy‘, pp. 6–7. 
consequences of policies and regulations, and that they — in extreme cases — could relocate 
if their interests are harmed too much. The membership, and to a lesser extent active 
participation in, business associations indicates the existence of ‗firm–firm‘ diplomacy.113 The 
data also revealed that three companies spontaneously mentioned the decreasing importance 
of Belgium‘s economic diplomacy for companies. Companies stated that there is a lack of 
people and resources in Belgian embassies, the importance of the European Union is 
increasing, and that the channel of embassies is somehow outdated. Once a company has set 
foot in a certain country, the relevance of embassies also diminishes rapidly. Finally, the 
existence of some form of internal organization of BD and CPA (albeit diverse), and the 
recognition that BD is useful, could indicate that BMNCs are increasingly aware of the 
importance of BD and are starting to organize their own diplomatic functions. Scholars such 
as Murray
114
 could be right that diplomacy offered by states is outdated and that companies 
are thus providing their own diplomacy.  
Do the above remarks suggest that BMNCs are indeed capable of providing faster, 
cheaper and more efficient diplomacy that is better adapted to the changing international 
environment? Are BMNCs also no longer depending on Belgian economic diplomacy?
115
 Is 
there a change in power where states are becoming subordinate to companies?   
Not necessarily. Depending on the subject and the institutional context, BMNCs will 
use Belgian economic diplomacy as one possible option that they have to defend their 
interests. Also, because the international level excludes companies‘ direct participation,116 
they seek the assistance of national diplomats. In short, BMNCs are to a certain extent 
depending on Belgian economic diplomacy, and this is most evident at the international level. 
Securing the survival of the company is essential and to do so, companies are obliged to 
develop certain strategies.
117
 The use of Belgian economic diplomacy can easily be explained 
from this perspective, and if companies did not see this diplomacy as useful, they simply 
would not use it. Remarkably, two of the companies that mentioned the decreasing relevance 
of state-like diplomacy actually praise Belgian diplomacy. The regular and direct contacts of 
BMNCs with Belgian diplomats and the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are also a clear 
indication that Belgian economic diplomacy is seen as relevant. BMNCs strive to build a 
network that includes a public–private dialogue with the Belgian diplomatic service, from the 
mutual realization that information-sharing is important.  
To conclude, Belgian economic diplomacy is still important,
118
 and is related to and is 
complementary to other types of diplomacy.
119
 Companies sometimes use their own 
diplomacy
120
 or they see seek government assistance.
121
 Does this imply a fundamental 
equality between the diplomacy that is offered by states and that of companies? This is 
unclear. One could conclude that both states and companies are using more diplomacy, yet 
there are, as this article describes, a number of trends that suggest that the balance of power is 
changing between both forms of diplomacy.  
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 Annexe 3: The Twelve BMNCs that were Contacted for this Research 
Company 
Name Sector Nationality Sales
122 
Presence 
in x 
countries Personnel 
            
AB-Inbev Brewing Belgian and US 27 30 120,000 
Agfa-Gevaert Chemistry Belgian  3,032 40 14,015 
Bekaert Metal processing Belgian 4 85 23,000 
Belgacom Telecommunications Belgian 6 8 17,500 
Colruyt Distribution Belgian 6,345 3 20,000 
Delhaize Group Distribution Belgian 18,961 7 141,000 
D'Ieteren Automobile Belgian 6,14 120 25,981 
Nyrstar Mining and metal processing 
Belgian and 
Australian 2,41 8 4,000 
Omega Pharma Pharmaceuticals Belgian 2,05 30 2,000 
Solvay Chemical and Pharmaceuticals Belgian 10 50 28,000 
UCB Pharmaceuticals Belgian 3,6 40 10,000 
Umicore Non-ferro metals Belgian 4,954 36 15,808 
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 Annexe 4: Model Presenting the Research Results 
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